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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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COMMISSIONER

SUSAN BITTER SMITH
COMMISSIONER

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COMMISSIONER

IN THE MATTER OF THE) DOCKET NO. RE-00000C-14-0112
PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO)
MODIFY THE RENEWABLE)
ENERGY STANDARD AND TARIFF) REPLY COMMENTS OF THE
RULES IN ACCORDANCE WITH) ALLIANCE FOR SOLAR CHOICE
ACC DECISION NO. 74365.) (TASC)

REPLY COMMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR SOLAR CHOICE
ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING

The Alliance for Solar Energy Choice (TASC) supports the comments filed in this proceeding by the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA). The reasons for our support are contained in the documents filed by various parties in dockets E-O1345A-10-0394, E-01345A-12-0290, E-01933A-12-0296 and E-04204A-12-0297. TASC hereby incorporates by reference the arguments and testimony filed in those cases, including but not limited to the documents attached to this filing.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of November, 2014.

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Surrebuttal Testimony of David Berry

Docket Nos. E-01345A-10-0394, E-01345A-12-0290, E-01933A-12-0296,
and E-04204A-12-0297

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1 **Introduction**

2
3 Q. Please state your name.

4
5 A. My name is David Berry.

6
7 Q. Did you previously file testimony in this matter?

8
9 A. Yes, on behalf of Western Resource Advocates (WRA).

10
11 Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?

12
13 A. I address: a) the central issues in this docket, b) controlling cost exposure when utilities
14 purchase renewable energy credits or certificates (RECs), c) protecting the value of RECs,
15 and d) RUCO's proposed temporary 50/50 split of RECs.
16

17 **The Central Issues in This Docket**

18
19 Q. What are the central issues facing the Commission in this proceeding?

20
21 A. While there are numerous disagreements among the parties (some of which are discussed
22 below), the central issues before the Commission are:

- 23
24 a) minimizing the utilities' costs of fostering distributed renewable energy,
25 b) encouraging early adoption of distributed renewable energy and innovation in
26 distributed renewable energy markets, thereby introducing a modest amount of
27 competition into the electricity market through distributed renewable energy, and
28 c) protecting the value of RECs from actions which devalue those RECs.
29

30 Currently, direct incentives for distributed renewable energy are at or close to zero but the
31 role of incentives in the future depends on whether and how the Commission modifies
32 net metering practices and changes rate designs. These changes will play out over time
33 and cannot be accurately projected or permanently settled today. The Commission should
34 not box itself in by eliminating the distributed renewable energy requirement at this time
35 as proposed by the utilities and should not destroy the value of RECs as proposed by Staff.
36

37 Q. Staff says that getting more information as proposed by WRA would cause an unnecessary
38 delay in resolving the issue of how to implement the distributed renewable energy
39 requirement when incentives are no longer needed (Staff rebuttal, page 2, starting on line
40 20). Does WRA's proposal cause an unnecessary delay?

41
42 A. No. First of all, Staff's proposed Track and Monitor approach devalues customers' RECs and
43 should not be implemented at all. Second, the utilities' proposal to eliminate the
44 distributed energy requirement is premature. The Commission's consideration of

1 eliminating the distributed energy requirement should take into account decisions on net
2 metering and rate design changes that it has not yet made. Depending on those future
3 changes, retention of the distributed renewable energy requirement and a REC acquisition
4 method may be necessary. A "delay" in accepting the utilities' proposal is, therefore, quite
5 appropriate. A temporary waiver of the distributed energy requirement until net metering
6 issues have been resolved and a REC acquisition method is adopted is also appropriate.
7 During the waiver period, the utilities could report kWh of energy produced by distributed
8 renewable energy projects to the Commission for informational purposes; because there
9 would be no distributed renewable energy requirement in effect, there would be no conflict
10 over ownership of RECs.

11
12 Q. Have other parties expressed similar concerns about a hasty resolution of the role of RECs,
13 the distributed renewable energy requirement, and incentives for distributed renewable
14 energy?

15
16 A. Yes. SEIA's and Vote Solar's direct testimony recognize the multiple factors and processes
17 that affect the development of a just and reasonable resolution. Also, RUCO recognizes the
18 many moving parts that must be considered (RUCO rebuttal, p. 6). RUCO states that
19 "finding a solution in an ever changing market presents a unique challenge" (rebuttal, p. 6,
20 lines 7-8), that it is necessary to "give the process time" (rebuttal, p. 6, line 11), and that
21 "the current system of REC transfer and viability of potential policies solutions ... could be
22 greatly impacted by the end result of the technical conference (on net metering) and
23 subsequent Commission decision" (rebuttal, p. 6, lines 17-20).

24
25 **Controlling Costs When Utilities Purchase RECs**

26
27 Q. Staff is concerned that using an auction type of approach to obtain RECs would lead to
28 uncertain costs of meeting the requirements of the Renewable Energy Standard because
29 the winning bid prices are uncertain (rebuttal p. 7, starting on line 25). What is the major
30 cause of this uncertainty?

31
32 A. The major cause is uncertainty about future Commission actions regarding net metering
33 practices and rate design changes. Potential changes to net metering practices and to rate
34 designs increase the risk to the customer contemplating an investment in distributed
35 renewable energy. Today, because the cost of distributed solar energy and retail electric
36 rates are about the same for many customers, incentives are not needed in many cases and
37 REC prices in Arizona are therefore likely to be low.¹ However, changes or potential
38 changes in net metering practices or rate designs could very well increase the need for
39 direct incentives to encourage distributed renewable energy, resulting in increased REC
40 prices.
41

¹ In general, the price of a REC is the difference between the cost of electricity generated with renewable energy and the cost of conventionally generated electricity. See my direct testimony, page 4, starting on line 32.

1 Q. Staff is also concerned that the Commission would have no direct control over the level of
2 incentives if an auction process were used (Staff rebuttal, p. 7, lines 13-14; p. 9, lines 9-10).
3 How can the Commission exercise control over the budget?
4

5 A. The Commission could establish an annual budget in its regular review of implementation
6 plans, based upon information provided by stakeholders, upon proposed budgets
7 developed by the utilities, and upon prior years' experience with REC prices. As an
8 alternative to an auction, WRA also proposed a technical conference approach to determine
9 whether incentives would be needed. If incentives are needed, they could be set
10 administratively or via an auction. In either the auction approach or the administrative
11 approach, the Commission could establish an annual budget for incentives in its regular
12 review of implementation plans.
13

14 Q. Could utilities include a "standard offer" bid price in soliciting bids in order to better
15 estimate the budget for an auction process?
16

17 A. Yes.
18

19 Q. Staff indicates that sellers of RECs in an auction process would be able to manipulate the
20 market and force up REC prices (Staff rebuttal, p. 8, lines 16-24). Is this a serious issue?
21

22 A. Not if the utilities adopt a well-designed auction process, based upon their previous
23 experience with bidding processes and experience in other states with auctions. Results of
24 the auctions should be made public, audited by or for Staff, and reviewed by the
25 Commission. Further, Arizona experience demonstrates a strong interest in distributed
26 generation by customers. Thus, market manipulation would require thousands of
27 customers to strategize in a coordinated manner to hold up the utilities. It is more likely
28 that the customers and their contractors would compete with each other to offer as low a
29 bid as they would need to proceed with their projects.² Losing bidders get no incentive.
30

31 Protecting the Value of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) 32

33 Q. Did Staff address the devaluation of RECs due to double counting inherent in its Track and
34 Monitor proposal in either its direct testimony or rebuttal?
35

36 A. No. The devaluation problem remains a major shortcoming in Staff's recommendations as
37 explained in my rebuttal testimony. Also, for the same reasons as explained in my rebuttal
38 testimony, customers would not be able sell their RECs under a track and monitor approach
39 despite TEP's and UNS's opinion to the contrary (TEP & UNS rebuttal page 3, starting at line
40 13).
41

² To further dilute the market power of REC sellers, utilities could accept bids only from individual project owners and not from REC aggregators.

1 Q. Wal-Mart's rebuttal testimony (page 3, starting at line 10 and page 3, starting at line 17)
2 references WRA's direct testimony and indicates that: a) if a utility were granted a
3 temporary waiver from the distributed energy requirement there would be no obligation
4 for it to comply with, and b) the information provided to the Commission on kWh of energy
5 produced by distributed renewable energy facilities would be for informational purposes
6 and not for satisfying any type of compliance obligation. Wal-Mart concludes that "contrary
7 to the suggestion of some other parties, it appears that kWhs reported to the Commission,
8 but not claimed to be satisfying a utility's RES DE requirement (because that requirement
9 was waived for a given year), or any other portion of the utility's RES requirements, would
10 not result in double counting ..." (p. 5, lines 8-12). Do you agree with Wal-Mart on this
11 point?
12

13 A. Yes. Wal-Mart's interpretation is the same as that in my direct testimony (page 10, lines 6
14 through 19, including footnote 16). There would be no double counting of RECs associated
15 with projects during the waiver period because there is no regulatory requirement
16 pertaining to distributed renewable energy in force.
17

18 Q. Tucson Electric Power Company and UNS Electric, Inc. (TEP & UNS) continue to maintain
19 that any value of RECs to the Affected Utilities is the result of the legal fiction created under
20 the Renewable Energy Standard and that renewable energy credits are a means of tracking
21 compliance (TEP & UNS rebuttal p. 5, lines 13-18). Does TEP & UNS's view constitute a fair
22 and complete understanding of RECs?
23

24 A. No. First, renewable energy comes with environmental and other attributes. Property
25 rights in these attributes are separable from the rights to electric energy (kWh) generated
26 by renewable resources and are traded in REC markets. "Unbundling" of attributes from an
27 underlying good or service is not unique to renewable energy. For instance, development
28 rights can be unbundled from land. Separable development rights underlie such practices
29 as public purchase of development rights to preserve open space, acquisition of
30 development rights by land trusts to preserve open space, and use of transferable
31 development rights to preserve open space.
32

33 Second, RECs associated with Arizona distributed renewable energy projects (and central
34 station renewable energy projects) would exist even if there were not a Renewable Energy
35 Standard in Arizona. Those RECs could be purchased by parties other than Arizona utilities
36 through voluntary or compliance markets or retained by their owners to demonstrate that
37 they are meeting their own clean energy goals.
38

39 Third, A.A.C. R14-2-1803 clarifies the property rights in RECs. Property rights demarcate
40 ownership of tradable credits and enable a clear transfer of control of the credits. Without
41 a clear assignment of rights in tradable credits, the Commission and the utility could not be
42 sure that the portfolio standard was being met. Additionally, without a clear assignment of
43 rights, owners of renewable generation equipment could not be sure of their ability to
44 capture the revenues from the production of eligible energy for which they have incurred

1 the costs. Further, buyers of RECs could not be sure that they aren't being swindled if
2 property rights are not clearly defined and enforceable.

3
4 Thus, RECs are not a fiction. They are real and exist whether or not TEP & UNS track them or
5 acquire them. Further, ambiguous property rights and double counting are real economic
6 problems that are addressed by the Commission's Renewable Energy Standard.

7
8 **RUCO's Proposed Temporary 50/50 Split of RECs**

9
10 Q. RUCO proposes splitting RECs 50/50 between the system owner and the utility to
11 temporarily resolve the issue of REC transfers and payments in the absence of incentives if
12 the Commission does not act on proposed net metering changes for "some time" (RUCO
13 rebuttal, starting on p. 7, line 19). How does RUCO envision the 50/50 split would work?

14
15 A. RUCO views the system owner/investor and the utility as "partners" – one providing the
16 capital and space to host the system and the other integrating the system into the grid. The
17 50/50 split of RECs is intended to be a compromise in which the customer would,
18 apparently, transfer half of his or her RECs to the utility for free. RUCO indicates that
19 commercial customers needing to retain all their RECs to meet their own goals would not
20 have to transfer any of their RECs to the utility.

21
22 Q. Is a 50/50 split a workable approach?

23
24 A. Probably not – there are too many unanswered questions and too many inappropriate
25 assumptions. First, system owners and utilities are not partners – they are parties to a
26 potential transaction, just as a utility and an independent power producer are parties to a
27 transaction to sell and purchase electricity. The parties have different objectives that may
28 be met by making a deal. The parties also have the option of not making a deal.

29
30 Second, there is no "compromise" unless the affected parties agree to it. A "compromise"
31 cannot be imposed on customers by the Commission or the utilities. In this case, RECs are
32 initially owned by the owners of the distributed renewable energy systems. RUCO's
33 proposal requires customers to hand over some of their property (RECs) to a utility without
34 compensation from the utility in order to obtain electric service. Why should customers
35 agree to hand over half their RECs to the utility in return for getting interconnection service
36 they are otherwise currently entitled to as utility customers? How would the utilities know
37 whether the customers have affirmatively agreed to transfer half their RECs and thus be
38 able to count the RECs? How could a customer be prevented from seeking compensation
39 from the utility for the utility's claiming ownership of the customer's RECs?

40
41 Third, what is the utility going to do with half the RECs? Would the utility have to try to get
42 customers to install twice as much distributed renewable energy as they otherwise would in
43 order to obtain sufficient RECs to meet regulatory requirements? How would they do this
44 without paying for the RECs?

1
2 **Conclusions**
3

4 Q. What should the Commission do in this matter?
5

6 A. Because of the interconnections among the Renewable Energy Standard, the distributed
7 renewable energy market, net metering policy, and rate design, a rush to change current
8 practices is counter-productive. In a complex system of interconnected factors, the
9 Commission cannot do just one thing. A comprehensive approach must be considered.
10

11 The Commission should reject Staff's Track and Monitor proposal, reject RUCO's 50/50 split
12 proposal, and hold off on eliminating the distributed renewable energy standard as
13 proposed by the utilities until there is concrete evidence that the distributed renewable
14 energy market can stand on its own without incentives, taking into account the effects of
15 any changes in net metering policy and significant changes in rate designs that affect the
16 economics of investor decisions regarding distributed renewable energy.
17

18 For now, the Commission should direct the utilities to either develop and implement an
19 auction type approach to acquire RECs or conduct a technical conference to obtain more
20 information. If the technical conference indicates that incentives are still needed because,
21 for example, the Commission modifies net metering practices, utilities could continue to
22 obtain RECs for distributed resources by employing the methods they previously used or by
23 using an auction.
24

25 Until the auction is set up or the technical conference is concluded (and appropriate
26 direction given by the Commission on the basis of the technical conference), the
27 Commission should, temporarily, waive compliance with the distributed renewable energy
28 requirements.
29

30 Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?
31

32 A. Yes.

1 Western Resource Advocates ("WRA") and The Vote Solar Initiative ("Vote
2 Solar") submit this Opening Brief.

3 **I. INTRODUCTION**

4 This case is about what, if anything, needs to be done if incentives for the
5 installation of distributed renewable energy facilities are eliminated. If the incentives are
6 eliminated, then the renewable energy credits ("RECs") associated with installations will
7 not be transferred to the utility companies. If the renewable energy credits are not
8 transferred, then the utilities cannot count the RECs produced by those installations
9 because they will not own them. That means that at some point the utilities may
10 potentially be out of compliance with the distributed energy requirement in the
11 Commission's Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff ("REST") rules.

12 The parties have set forth numerous proposals for the Commission's consideration
13 to address this potential problem. Some parties have advocated for proposals that go well
14 beyond what is necessary to address the very narrow problem presented in this
15 proceeding. However, it is important for the Commission to proceed with caution. There
16 are numerous circumstances affecting the market for the deployment of distributed solar
17 energy facilities and the incentives are just one part of a larger issue. That issue is
18 whether the Commission will continue to support the deployment of distributed solar
19 energy for residential and nonresidential customers.

20 Resolution of the matters in this proceeding is closely related to the resolution of
21 the net metering application filed by APS on July 12, 2013 in Docket No. E-01345A-13-
22 0248. Therefore, the Commission should do what is minimally necessary to address the
23 problem regarding the acquisition of RECs in this proceeding and retain as much
24 flexibility as possible to address net metering and other issues as they affect distributed
25

1 renewable energy production in the future. Even APS's net metering application
2 suggests that incentives may be necessary if the net metering practices of the proposal
3 have a negative effect on the deployment of distributed energy (APS net metering
4 application, pp. 2, 14-15). It is obviously premature to assume that incentives will be
5 eliminated. The Commission should retain the flexibility it needs to make use of
6 incentives if net metering practices are changed.

7 **II. SCOPE OF THIS PROCEEDING**

8 In Decision No. 73636, the Commission directed:

9 ...[T]he hearing division to schedule a procedural conference, entertain
10 requests for intervention, hold a hearing, and prepare a recommended
11 opinion and order ("ROO") for Commission consideration on the "track
12 and record" proposal and potential alternatives. The ROO should evaluate
13 whether adoption of the "track and record" proposal (or alternatives
14 thereto) would require modifications to the REST rules. Decision No.
15 73636 at 6.

16 There is nothing in the Commission's direction to indicate that some kind of
17 seismic policy shift was being contemplated. APS had identified what it believes is a
18 problem concerning acquisition of RECs if incentives are no longer made available and
19 the Commission directed the Hearing Division to address that problem and that problem
20 only. There is no hint in the direction from the Commission that it wanted to change the
21 Renewable Energy Standard or eliminate the distributed energy carve out. If those issues
22 are to be considered by the Commission, it should be done in an appropriate proceeding.
23 This case is not that proceeding.

24 **III. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM**

25 At the outset, it is important to consider what problem we are trying to address in
this proceeding. The fundamental problem is that there may come a day, if incentives are
eliminated, when the utilities are unable to comply with the REST rules because they

1 cannot acquire the necessary RECs. The REST rules determine compliance by counting
2 RECs. A.A.C. R14-2-1805(A) provides that:

3 In order to improve system reliability, each effected utility shall be required
4 to satisfy a distributed renewable energy requirement by obtaining
renewable energy credits from distributed renewable energy resources.

5 A renewable energy credit means "the unit created to track kWh derived from an eligible
6 renewable energy resource or kWh equivalent of conventional energy resources displaced
7 by distributed renewable energy resources." A.A.C.R. 14-2-1801 (N).

8 Arizona Public Service Company is compliant with the distributed energy carve
9 out for residential customers through the end of 2016 and for commercial customers
10 through the end of 2019. Therefore, the earliest that APS will have any kind of issue
11 with compliance is at the beginning of 2017. A lot can happen between now and then.
12 For example, Commission action in the net metering proceeding may lead the
13 Commission to require that incentives be provided to customers for the installation of
14 distributed energy. If incentives are either continued or reactivated between now and the
15 end of 2016, then it is unlikely that APS will have any problem that needs solving.

16 TEP and UNS are currently compliant with the DE carve out and will be through
17 the end of 2013. TEP is compliant for commercial distributed energy through the end of
18 2016. The RES implementation plan filed by TEP on July 1, 2013 in Docket No. E-
19 01933A-13-0224, has proposed three options with regard to distributed energy. The first
20 is to maintain a \$0.10 per watt upfront incentive for residential projects and non-
21 residential projects (up to 70 kW). The second is to maintain the \$0.10 per watt upfront
22 incentive for residential projects only, and the third is to provide no new additional
23 incentives. Depending on the Commission's disposition of TEP's request, it may well be
24 that TEP will continue to acquire RECs through 2014 at a minimum.

1 Therefore, at least for APS and TEP, if they have a problem it is not immediate
2 and it is not substantial. In fact, if nothing is done in this proceeding, there is nothing in
3 the REST rules to prevent them from acquiring RECs from customers with new
4 installations by purchase or otherwise. As APS itself indicated at the hearing, the current
5 purchase price for RECs is approaching zero. As the witness for Vote Solar testified,
6 APS and TEP might be able to acquire RECs with gift cards from Starbucks.¹

7 That being the case, one has to wonder why both APS and TEP have proposed
8 elimination of the distributed energy carve out as a long term solution. We don't even
9 know what the short term holds in store for us much less the long term, but at least based
10 on current circumstances, the acquisition of RECs would appear to be a relatively small
11 expense for the utilities. Even if at the time of acquisition the expense is more than
12 minimal, APS and TEP can file an appropriate application for relief with the
13 Commission.

14
15
16
17 ¹ During the hearing the relationship between incentives and the price of RECs was
18 discussed. As the Commission's Renewable Energy Standard has been implemented, the
19 incentive offered by utilities for distributed renewable energy projects is equal to the
20 REC price. In a well-functioning REC market, "the difference between the market price
21 of electricity generated with renewable resources and the market price of electricity
22 generated by conventional means represents the premium for energy from renewable
23 resources. ... The price of tradable credits equals the premium for renewable energy"
24 (David Berry, "The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits," *Ecological
25 Economics*, vol. 42, no. 3, September 2002, p. 374). "[M]arket forces will tie the price of
tradable credits to the cost difference between generating electricity from renewable
resources and generating electricity from conventional resources" (Berry, p. 377). To
overcome the disincentive attributable to the cost premium for renewable energy, utilities
offer an incentive to customers to invest in distributed solar energy. The incentive should
equal the cost premium which equals the REC price.

1 IV. THE ORIGINAL TRACK AND RECORD PROPOSAL

2 In APS' 2013 REST implementation plan, the Company proposed no new
3 incentives for residential and non-residential distributed energy in 2013. In response,
4 Staff proposed a \$0.10 per watt incentive so that APS could determine whether incentives
5 would be helpful in 2014. Assuming that there would be no incentives in future years,
6 APS proposed a "Track and Record" method of meeting the REST requirements.

7 The Track and Record proposal assumes that no incentives would be provided but
8 would count the energy produced from such installations toward compliance with the
9 REST standard for distributed energy. Numerous parties submitted comments in
10 response to the proposal, many suggesting that counting distributed energy (DE) or
11 distributed generation (DG) kWhs to establish compliance without acquiring the RECs
12 would devalue the customers' RECs and constitute a taking of their property without
13 compensation. On November 15, 2012, the Center for Resource Solutions (CRS)
14 submitted a letter to the Docket (Docketed on November 16, 2012) explaining the
15 problem:

16 Enabling utilities to use kWh from customer DG facilities instead of RECs
17 for REST purposes would effectively destroy the market for voluntary
18 RECs from DG in Arizona, and may prevent such RECs access to other
19 RPS markets as well. The Arizona voluntary REC market is thriving, in
20 large part because the owners of DG facilities are able to claim the RECs
21 produced from the renewable energy and sell them in either the voluntary
22 or the compliance market. In 2010, Arizona had approximately 3,200
residential customers and 80 non-residential customers purchase renewable
energy in the voluntary market, and Arizona renewable generators
generated nearly 28,000 MWh that were sold into the voluntary REC
market.

23 CRS further noted that:

24 Under the track and record approach kWh from the renewable DG facility
25 are effectively credited to the utility company for REST compliance. Use
of the renewable kWh to meet or determine a compliance obligation renders

1 the DG customer's REC effectively taken and used by the utility. Unless
2 the utility purchased or otherwise contractually received the REC, the
3 utility would be double counting the REC that rightfully belongs to the DG
owner, resulting in the DG owner being unable to sell their REC into the
voluntary market or, potentially, other states' RPS markets.

4 CRS stated that a proposal similar to Track and Record was adopted in Hawaii with
5 devastating effects on the voluntary market for DG RECs. Instead, CRS encouraged the
6 Commission to reject the Track and Record approach to REST compliance and to pursue
7 alternative market mechanisms that would enable utilities to purchase and aggregate
8 RECs from DG to count towards REST compliance. Such market solutions could include
9 a standard offer to DG customers for their RECs or using REC brokers to help aggregate
10 DG RECs for sale to utilities.

11 Because of the questions raised about the track and record proposal, this
12 proceeding was established to consider not only Track and Record but other alternative
13 options.

14 **V. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION**

15 Staff proposed five important considerations for evaluation of the proposals. They
16 are as follows:

- 17 1. Provide a clear and easily documented way for utilities to achieve
18 compliance under the REST rules;
 - 19 2. Recognize reality regarding how much electric load is actually being met
20 with renewable energy;
 - 21 3. Minimize the cost to ratepayers;
 - 22 4. Maximize value to the extent possible for those who undertake DE
23 installations and Arizona as a whole; and
 - 24 5. Be minimally invasive to the REST rules.
- 25

1 WRA/Vote Solar do not disagree with Staff's identification of considerations but would
2 add flexibility as an important consideration as well. As noted earlier, any solution that
3 locks the Commission into a fixed path for the indefinite future is unwise given the
4 changing circumstances surrounding the deployment of distributed energy. Any proposal
5 adopted by the Commission should provide enough flexibility to adapt to those changing
6 circumstances.

7 In summary, WRA/Vote Solar support proposals that are flexible, preserve the
8 integrity of RECs, maintain the REST rules and promote compliance with them. There
9 are several proposals that satisfy these criteria in some measure and several that have
10 fatal flaws.

11 **VI. PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF RECs**

12 **A. The Double Counting Issue**

13 Because the issue of double counting RECs is what triggered this proceeding, it is
14 important to understand the concept of double counting RECs and why double counting
15 should be avoided in any proposal adopted by the Commission.

16 The Center for Resource Solutions has established the Green-e Energy National
17 Standard for Renewable Electricity Products. The standard is intended to protect buyers
18 of RECs by mandating accountability on retail products sold to consumers. Double
19 counting is not permitted under the Green-e National Standard.

20 CRS does not set state renewable energy policies. Rather, CRS certifies that
21 RECs represent the attributes of renewable energy production so that buyers of the RECs
22 can be assured that they are getting what they are paying for. This includes assurance
23 that the RECs are associated with eligible renewable resources (such as solar energy) and
24 that the RECs have not been claimed by another party.

1 CRS's National Standard (Green-e Energy National Standard Version 2.3, April
2 23, 2013) "defines standards for renewable electricity and renewable energy certificates
3 (RECs) sold in Green-e Energy certified sales, in order to help promote high quality
4 renewable electricity development and generation, and the environmental benefits of such
5 generation in place of traditional fuels used for electricity" (p. 2). Among its objectives
6 (http://green-e.org/about_miss.shtml) are:

- 7 • Bolstering customer confidence in the reliability of retail electricity products
8 reflecting renewable energy generation.
- 9 • Providing customers clear information about retail clean energy products to enable
10 them to make informed purchasing decisions.

11 CRS also states that its verification process gives customers confidence in their
12 choice of renewable energy options and suppliers and that many large customers
13 (Commercial & Industrial, federal, state and local governments) require Green-e
14 certification in their solicitations (http://green-e.org/getcert_re_why.shtml).

15 CRS's website (http://green-e.org/getcert_re.shtml) further describes CRS's
16 activities as follows: "When you see our logo and buy renewable energy that is Green-e
17 Energy Certified, you know that:

- 18 • You are supporting new renewable resources: The windmill, solar panel or other
19 generator that produced your renewable energy was built since 1997.
- 20 • There has been no double selling: You are the only one that can claim the benefits
21 of the renewable energy you bought; these benefits include the fact that renewable
22 energy produces little or no greenhouse gas emissions.
- 23 • Your purchase goes beyond business as usual: You are buying renewable energy
24 beyond what is required by law or claimed against a mandate, and are helping
25 expand the production of renewable energy in the U.S. and Canada."

1 In conclusion, the Commission sets utility policy in Arizona, but in setting a
2 policy the Commission should be cognizant of the consequences of that policy. If the
3 Commission adopted Staff's Track & Monitor approach, the result would be a
4 devaluation of customers' RECs as explained in this brief.

5 **B. Property Rights in RECs.**

6 Tucson Electric Power Company and UNS Electric, Inc. maintain that any value
7 of RECs to the Affected Utilities is the result of a legal fiction created under the
8 Renewable Energy Standard and that renewable energy credits are a means of tracking
9 compliance (TEP & UNS rebuttal p. 5, lines 13-18). TEP and UNS misrepresent the role
10 of RECs. First, renewable energy comes with environmental and other attributes.
11 Property rights in these attributes are separable from the rights to electric energy (kWh)
12 generated by renewable resources and are traded in REC markets. "Unbundling" of
13 attributes from an underlying good or service is not unique to renewable energy. For
14 instance, development rights can be unbundled from land. Separable development rights
15 underlie such practices as public purchase of development rights to preserve open space,
16 acquisition of development rights by land trusts to preserve open space, and use of
17 transferable development rights to preserve open space.

18 Second, RECs associated with Arizona distributed renewable energy projects (and
19 central station renewable energy projects) would exist even if there were not a Renewable
20 Energy Standard in Arizona. Those RECs could be purchased by parties other than
21 Arizona utilities through voluntary REC markets or retained by their owners to
22 demonstrate that they are meeting their own clean energy goals.

23 Third, A.A.C. R14-2-1803C indicates that a Renewable Energy Credit is owned
24 by the owner of the Eligible Renewable Energy Resource from which it was derived
25 unless specifically transferred. Thus, a REC owner has rights associated with RECs. The

1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") states that a REC "represents the
2 property rights to the environmental, social, and other nonpower qualities of renewable
3 electricity generation. A REC, and its associated attributes and benefits, can be sold
4 separately from the underlying physical electricity associated with a renewable-based
5 generation source." (<http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm>).

6 More generally, "Property rights delineate ownership of tradable credits and
7 enable the legally recognized transfer of control of the credits. Without a clear
8 assignment of rights to tradable credits, the regulator and the utility required to meet the
9 portfolio standard could not be sure that the portfolio standard was being met.
10 Additionally, without a clear assignment of rights, owners of renewable generation
11 equipment could not be sure of their ability to capture the revenues from the production
12 of eligible energy for which they have incurred the costs." (David Berry, "The Market for
13 Tradable Renewable Energy Credits," *Ecological Economics*, vol. 42, no. 3, September
14 2002: p. 372). Further, buyers of RECs could not be sure that they aren't being swindled
15 if property rights are not clearly defined and enforceable.

16 Thus, RECs are not a fiction. They are real and exist whether or not TEP & UNS
17 track them or acquire them. Further, property rights in RECs are addressed by the
18 Commission's Renewable Energy Standard (A.A.C. R14-2-1803).

19 **VII. EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS**

20 **A. WRA's Proposal**

21 WRA believes that if utilities need RECs to comply with the distributed renewable
22 energy requirements, utilities should purchase the RECs. This is straightforward,
23 provides incentives to customers if incentives are needed, could be used only when
24 utilities need RECs, and does not require a change in the REST rule. No double counting
25

1 problem occurs and the ability of the Commission to apply incentives when necessary to
2 increase adoption of distributed renewable energy is preserved.

3 WRA proposed two alternatives for acquiring RECs:

- 4 1. Use an auction process to obtain RECs from distributed renewable energy projects
5 to comply with the current distributed renewable energy requirement if additional
6 RECs are needed, or
- 7 2. Conduct a technical conference to obtain reliable information on the effect on the
8 rate of adoption of distributed renewable energy of eliminating incentives,
9 changing net metering practices, or changing rate designs for electric service. If
10 the technical conference indicates that incentives are still needed because, for
11 example, the Commission modifies net metering practices, utilities could continue
12 to obtain RECs for distributed resources by employing the methods they
13 previously used or by using an auction if additional RECs are needed.

14 The specifics of an auction or similar approach, including the terms of REC
15 purchases, should be developed through a collaborative process among Staff, utilities,
16 and stakeholders so that the auction is workable, fair, effective, and consistent with the
17 Renewable Energy Standard. The utilities, Staff, and stakeholders should provide the
18 Commission with their recommendations within six months of the effective date of the
19 decision in this matter. A well-designed auction process will reveal the level of
20 incentives needed to attract investment in distributed resources, including situations in
21 which the net metering rule is modified (or expected to be modified) and rate design
22 changes are adopted. If incentives are not needed, the market price for RECs should be
23 very low in all Arizona market segments (PV, solar hot water, other technologies, and
24 residential, commercial, government, and school sectors).

1 It is appropriate for the Commission to waive the distributed renewable energy
2 requirement until an auction method is adopted or the results from the technical
3 conference are reviewed by the Commission and the Commission takes action on the
4 matter.

5 Staff raised the issue of the Commission's control over the level of incentives if an
6 auction process were used. The Commission could establish an annual budget in its
7 regular review of implementation plans, based upon information provided by
8 stakeholders, proposed budgets developed by the utilities, and prior years' experience
9 with REC prices. Further, the Commission could require utilities to set a maximum REC
10 price or "standard offer." If a technical conference approach is adopted to determine
11 whether incentives would be needed and if incentives are needed, they could be set
12 administratively or via an auction as just described.

13 Staff also raised the issue of whether sellers of RECs in an auction process would
14 be able to manipulate the market and force up REC prices. The Commission could take
15 several steps to eliminate the effects of market power. First, results of any auctions
16 should be made public, audited by or for Staff, and reviewed by the Commission. Second,
17 a reasonable maximum bid price or maximum incentive ("standard offer") could counter
18 sellers' ability inflate REC prices.

19 **B. Vote Solar Proposal**

20 Vote Solar proposed an administratively simple and low-cost market-based
21 standard offer method for continued acquisition of RECs if and when incentives are
22 trimmed to zero. This method, however small the successful payment offer, avoids
23 double-counting and maintains the integrity of the REST.

24 Utilities and load-serving entities across the country have actively conducted
25 market-based solicitations to obtain RECs for compliance with state-based renewable

1 policies. Additionally, Arizona utilities have used a similar approach in soliciting non-
2 residential solar projects, as well, based on the uniform credit purchase program or
3 UCPP. The UCPP was developed in 2006 by a broad range of stakeholders representing
4 utilities (including the cooperatives), renewable industries, cities and state government.
5 APS for example, would solicit for a certain number of RECs at a certain price, but allow
6 bidders to offer RECs at a lower price. These cheaper RECs would be purchased first. A
7 similar structure can be established here, if and when it becomes necessary.

8 Vote Solar suggested an initial *quarterly* offer to purchase a limited number of
9 RECs to test market values, while encouraging REC owners to offer RECs at a price
10 lower than the standard offer. Such lower priced RECs, if offered would be acquired first
11 in order of cost. Over time, the offers and timing can be refined. The Standard Offer
12 should be open to system owners and third party aggregators who acquire RECs and/or
13 bid them on customers' behalf.

14 This procurement method is consistent with Arizona law and Commission rules
15 and does not require special consideration, creative work-arounds, obfuscating semantics,
16 rule modifications or on-going waivers. Indeed, it is similar to the method used by the
17 IOUs to acquire commercial solar RECs in the early days of the standard. It uses the
18 market to assure that residential RECs are acquired at the lowest cost while respecting the
19 property rights of solar system owners. Third, it avoids unnecessary complexity and
20 administrative or regulatory burdens and uses a mechanism with which the utilities have
21 experience.

22 Finally, it puts Arizona in a leadership position on valuing and acquiring RECs so
23 that as other state markets reach a similar point in their evolution, the Arizona model can
24 be replicated elsewhere.

1 Any administrative preparation that is required can occur prior to the elimination
2 of incentives. However, Vote Solar does not oppose a limited waiver of the residential
3 portion of Section 1805 for up to one year.

4 **C. RUCO Baseline Proposal**

5 RUCO proposed a new approach to RECs in its surrebuttal -- the "baseline"
6 concept. While RUCO's proposal is rather general, the concept should be considered by
7 the Commission.

8 The baseline concept is as follows. In its annual review of utility implementation
9 plans, the Commission would establish a baseline amount of distributed renewable
10 energy generation capacity (MW) that represents an acceptable level of, or acceptable
11 growth rate of, distributed renewable energy in lieu of the distributed renewable energy
12 requirements in the Renewable Energy Standard. The Commission would obtain
13 information from utilities and interested parties on the particular level of the baseline
14 each year when reviewing utility implementation plans for the next year. For example,
15 the baseline might be an increase of 100 MW of distributed renewable energy projects
16 from a previous year.

17 If the amount of distributed generation in a utility's service area meets or exceeds
18 the baseline amount in the year prior to the implementation plan year, the utility's
19 distributed renewable energy requirement would be waived for the next year. If the level
20 of distributed generation in a utility's service area does not meet the baseline, the
21 Commission would require the utility to engage in an auction or otherwise purchase
22 sufficient RECs in the next year to comply with the distributed renewable energy goal in
23 the Renewable Energy Standard.

24 A crucial element of the baseline proposal is setting the baseline in a manner that
25 does not result in double counting, i.e., that does not create a potential for multiple claims

1 to the same RECs and that does not devalue a customer's RECs. Parties participating in
2 the Commission's review of an implementation plan should provide support for their
3 opinion on whether double counting of RECs could occur.

4 It is appropriate for the Commission to waive the distributed renewable energy
5 requirement until the baseline method is approved in its review of the 2015 renewable
6 energy standard implementation plans which would be filed in 2014.

7 Finally, the Commission should hold all utilities to the total renewable energy
8 requirements contained in A.A.C. R14-2-1804, regardless of whether the distributed
9 requirement is waived.

10 **D. Staff's Modified Baseline Proposal**

11 Staff was concerned that under RUCO's baseline proposal, the Commission would
12 not have a direct linkage between the amount renewable energy deployed in Arizona and
13 compliance with RES requirements. Volume 4 at 692. As Staff witness Gray stated:

14 Simply put, the numbers do not add up as they do under the current RES
15 rules or Staff's track and monitor proposal. So RUCO's proposal would
16 not fully meet Staff's goal number 2...

Transcript, Volume IV at 692-3.

17 As Mr. Gray further explained, RUCO's revision might be problematic in regard to how
18 it relates to the annual cycle for Commission consideration of RES plans. Therefore,
19 Staff determined that if the Commission were to decide to move toward a variation of the
20 track and monitor proposal that did not have a direct link to actual renewable energy
21 production, "Staff would prefer to simply have the full DE piece for a given year be
22 waived and then the Commission would determine each following year if another waiver
23 should be granted or other action taken." Volume IV at 693.

24 Explained another way, Staff believes its modification of RUCO's baseline
25 proposal is a "simpler way to get to basically the same point." Volume IV at 699. Once

1 there is no direct tie to the 15% RES level or some lower level where the numbers all add
2 up, Staff testified that a waiver makes more sense than the more complicated process that
3 RUCO put forth "recognizing that they are...in the same ball park as proposals."
4 Volume IV at 700. Staff recognized that there are changing circumstances that will affect
5 customers' installation of distributed generation. That is why Staff was uncomfortable
6 with a permanent elimination of that carve out. However, Staff believed that it can get to
7 a similar result with the year - to - year waiver "but giving the Commission more
8 flexibility to react as things change in the market." Volume IV at 701. Staff believes that
9 the mechanism should be sufficiently flexible to react to changing circumstances. *Id.*

10 Staff testified that it believes this modified version of RUCO's baseline proposal is
11 a viable option for the Commission to consider if the Commission decides not to adopt
12 Staff's track and monitor proposal. It would not require any change to the REST rules
13 and it avoids any potential for double counting. Volume IV at 722.

14 **E. Staff's Track and Monitor Proposal**

15 Under Staff's Track and Monitor method, the Renewable Energy Standard
16 requirement would be reduced for each utility on a kWh per kWh basis for all distributed
17 energy that is produced in its service territory where no REC transfer to the utility takes
18 place. Staff provides numerical examples in Exhibit RGG-2. All customers' distributed
19 energy production would be metered and that energy would either fall into: (1) the
20 category where the utility receives the RECs, or (2) the category of production facilities
21 where no incentive is taken and no RECs are transferred to the utility. Production from
22 category 1 would count toward meeting the utility's Renewable Energy Standard
23 compliance requirement, and production from category 2 would reduce the utility's
24 Renewable Energy Standard requirement.

1 This method creates a double counting predicament for REC owners. According
2 to the Green-e Energy National Standard for Renewable Electricity Products, "Eligible
3 RECs or renewable energy can be used once and only once ... Renewable energy or
4 RECs (or the renewable or environmental attributes incorporated in that REC) that can be
5 legitimately claimed by another party may NOT be used in Green-e Energy Certified
6 REC products."²

7 In particular, energy (kWh) produced from eligible renewable resources for which
8 the RECs are not transferred to the utility would be used to reduce the renewable energy
9 requirement under the Track and Monitor method. Thus, the RECs associated with these
10 kWh are implicitly counted to adjust the regulatory requirement. Consequently, those
11 RECs cannot also be used by the customer to meet his or her own renewable energy goals
12 nor can they be sold by the customer to another party because the RECs would be double
13 counted. As a result, in the case where the utility counts renewable kWh from distributed
14 resources to adjust the renewable energy requirement without actually obtaining the
15 RECs, Staff's proposal devalues a customer's RECs without compensation to the
16 customer. One REC cannot serve two purposes. Therefore, Staff's Track and Monitor
17 approach should be rejected.

18 **F. RUCO's 50/50 Proposal**

19 The Commission should reject RUCO's 50/50 split proposal because there are too
20 many unanswered questions and too many inappropriate assumptions.

21 The proposal cannot accurately be called a "compromise" as depicted by RUCO
22 unless the affected parties agree to it. A "compromise" cannot be imposed on customers
23 by the Commission or the utilities. In this case, RECs are initially owned by the owners
24

25 ² Center for Resource Solutions, *Green-e Energy, National Standard Version 2.3*, p. 9.

1 of the distributed renewable energy systems. RUCO's proposal requires customers to
2 hand over some of their property (RECs) to a utility without compensation from the
3 utility in order to obtain electric service. Why should customers agree to hand over half
4 their RECs to the utility in return for getting interconnection service they are otherwise
5 currently entitled to as utility customers? How would the utilities know whether the
6 customers have affirmatively agreed to transfer half their RECs and thus be able to count
7 the RECs? How could a customer be prevented from seeking compensation from the
8 utility for the utility's claiming ownership of the customer's RECs?

9 An additional concern is what the utility is going to do with only half the RECs.
10 Would the utility have to try to get customers to install twice as much distributed
11 renewable energy as they otherwise would in order to obtain sufficient RECs to meet
12 regulatory requirements? How would they do this without paying for the RECs?

13 Finally, RUCO revealed during the hearing that in order to incent customers to
14 give half their RECs to the utility (for no compensation) under the 50/50 split proposal, a
15 "stick" is necessary such as the utility charging a fee for not turning over the RECs. This
16 kind of punitive approach applied to customers is poor public policy, distorts the purpose
17 of incentives to encourage distributed renewable energy generation, and would be
18 extremely difficult for the Commission to justify to the public.

19 **G. The Utilities' Proposal**

20 The utilities' main proposal is to eliminate the distributed generation carve-out and
21 thereby eliminate the need to acquire distributed energy RECs. APS proposed that the
22 REST total requirement (A.A.C. R14-2-1804) would be unchanged. As indicated above,
23 elimination of the distributed generation carve-out in A.A.C. R14-2-1805 is premature
24 because incentives may be needed in the future to accelerate early adoption of distributed
25 resources if net metering rules change, if rate structures are changed, or for other reasons.

1 These types of changes are proposed in APS's net metering application. The utilities'
2 proposals should be rejected. WRA and Vote Solar also support retention of the current
3 standard in A.A.C. R14-2-1804.

4 **VIII. CONCLUSIONS**

5 The threshold question in this matter is whether anything needs to be done to
6 achieve compliance with the distributed generation portion of the Renewable Energy
7 Standard if incentives are no longer needed. One avenue available to the Commission is
8 to do nothing in this docket and simply authorize utilities to purchase RECs from
9 distributed resources as needed in its review of implementation plans. If incentives are
10 rarely needed, the REC price will be minimal.

11 WRA and Vote Solar recommend that either: (a) the Commission adopt an auction
12 proposal with the option of the Commission capping the price, or (b) the Commission
13 require utilities to employ a standard offer to purchase RECs that is regularly revised and
14 updated. The auction process or standard offer mechanism would be reviewed each year
15 when the Commission considers the REST implementation plans. No fundamental
16 change to current practice is needed. Under either the auction or standard offer approach,
17 the utilities would seek to acquire at least the volume of RECs necessary to meet the
18 REST requirements each year. If no RECs are needed, no acquisition is required. If
19 incentives are occasionally needed to attract investments in distributed solar energy, REC
20 prices will be very low. Both WRA's and Vote Solar's proposals maintain the existing
21 rule, require no regulatory contortions to meet the distributed generation requirement, do
22 not double count RECs, provide flexibility to alter incentives as market conditions
23 change (e.g., if net metering practices are changed or rates are redesigned), and are
24 simple and practical. The utilities can also report kWh of distributed energy as required
25 by A.A.C. R14-2-1812(B)(1) and (2).


1 The RUCO baseline proposal may be an acceptable solution but setting the
2 baseline could be a difficult process.

3 Staff's modification to the RUCO baseline proposal which would allow the
4 Commission to annually evaluate the need for incentives and implement waivers as
5 appropriate may also be a potential solution. It preserves flexibility for the Commission
6 and does not require any change to the rules.

7 The utilities' proposal to eliminate the distributed generation requirement, the
8 Staff Track and Monitor proposal, the original Track and Record proposal, and RUCO's
9 50/50 split proposal should all be rejected. Elimination of the distributed generation
10 requirement reduces the Commission's flexibility and is premature as there is no reason
11 to believe that incentives will never be needed again, especially in light of APS's net
12 metering proposal. The Track and Monitor and Track and Record proposals result in
13 double counting of RECs. The 50/50 split proposal is unworkable.

14 DATED this 27th day of August, 2013.

15
16 ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW IN
17 THE PUBLIC INTEREST

18 By 
19 Timothy M. Hogan
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21 Phoenix, Arizona 85004
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23
24
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
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JUL 19 2013

Arizona Corporation Commission
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OFFICE OF
AIR AND RADIATION

Mr. Bob Stump
Chairman
Arizona Corporation Commission
1200 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Subject: Using "Track and Record" for compliance with the distributed generation portion of the Arizona Renewable Energy Standard (Docket Nos. E-01345A-10-0394 et al.)

Dear Chairman Stump:

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is writing to express concern with the proposed shift to a Track and Record method for utilities to demonstrate compliance with the distributed generation (DG) portion of the state's Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff (REST) instead of the current practice of procuring and retiring Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).

EPA supports the development of clean, renewable energy resources for electric power generation through the national voluntary program – the Green Power Partnership – which recruits commercial, institutional and governmental organizations to increase their use of renewable electricity. Currently, EPA partners with over 1,400 organizations that purchase or self-generate more than 27 billion kWh of green power annually. These renewable electricity purchases were equal to 0.6% of U.S. electricity sales in 2011 and are above-and-beyond regulatory requirements.

Track and Record, as proposed, would open the door to double-counting the voluntary purchases and the self-generation of renewable electricity from Arizona DG systems that may be in excess of state mandates by allowing utilities to tally the same renewable electricity generation toward meeting their REST requirements. To protect its Partners' ability to make environmental claims, the Green Power Partnership would have to revise programmatic eligibility standards to exclude renewable electricity generated from DG systems in Arizona. This could negatively impact those Green Power Partners operating in Arizona and any out-of-state Partners currently procuring RECs from Arizona. EPA would rather not take this step, as it would narrow the options available to our Partners. It is in the interest of avoiding that possibility that we provide our comments on this issue.

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1 Western Resource Advocates ("WRA") and The Vote Solar Initiative ("Vote
2 Solar") submit the following Reply brief. This brief addresses several issues including
3 some parties' misunderstanding of RECs and REC markets, the acquisition of RECs, the
4 double counting problem, and the distributed generation (DG) carve out.

5 **A. Misunderstanding of RECs and REC Markets**

6 Some of the positions taken by parties to this docket reflect a fundamental
7 misunderstanding of the role of RECs and of how REC prices are determined. Principles
8 of RECs and REC markets were summarized in WRA/Vote Solar's opening brief.
9 However, several misunderstandings persist as explained below.

10 APS states (Closing Brief, p. 4, starting on line 15) that no market exists into
11 which Arizona DG REC owners could sell their RECs. Witnesses Huber and Martin,
12 cited by APS, actually said that they did not know how many Arizona distributed
13 generation RECs were sold. CRS further described the volume of activity in the
14 voluntary market: "In 2011, Green-e Energy verification found that Arizona had 2,986
15 residential customers and 146 non-residential customers purchase renewable energy in
16 the voluntary market, and Arizona renewable generators generated 29,997 MWh that
17 were sold into the voluntary REC market to customers inside and outside of the state."
18 (Jennifer Martin, Direct Testimony, unnumbered p. 7). Up until recently, nearly all DG
19 RECs in Arizona have been purchased by utilities through their DG incentives. If
20 incentives are no longer needed or allowed, and the Commission does not authorize a
21 track and monitor type of policy which creates a double counting issue, then the future
22 volume of Arizona DG RECs sold in the voluntary market may increase as the
23 compliance market evaporates.

24 APS further states (Closing Brief, p. 4, line 18) that "Without a change to the
25 REST rules, it is not clear if an owner of RECs can sell them to anyone other than a

1 utility as RECs are defined under Arizona law.” This statement is untrue. RECs exist
2 even if the Commission had no REST (Berry surrebuttal, p. 4 starting at line 33). The
3 Commission does not regulate customers or what customers do with their property.
4 Arizonans buy and sell RECs as noted above and Arizona customers can and do retain
5 their RECs to meet their own clean energy goals (see, for example, the U.S. Department
6 of Defense and All Other Federal Executive Agencies’ Brief, pp. 2-3) .

7 APS indicates (Closing Brief, p. 5, starting on line 6) that rules created by a
8 California non-profit should not determine Arizona’s energy policy. CRS is not
9 determining Arizona energy policy – it assures buyers of RECs that they are getting what
10 they are paying for. The Commission should understand the consequences of its policies:
11 the ability or inability of customers to sell or use their RECs is an important consequence
12 of the choices presented in this docket. Further, the fact that CRS is located in California
13 is immaterial. CRS’s policies encompass North America. APS does not ignore national
14 reliability standards even though an out of state entity (the North American Electric
15 Reliability Corporation) develops these standards.

16 TEP and UNS attempt to obfuscate the nature of RECs by implying that the RECs
17 needed to comply with the REST are somehow different than the RECs traded in
18 voluntary markets, apparently because some RECs allegedly do not include
19 environmental attributes (Initial Post-Hearing Brief, pp. 10, 12-14). In actuality, RECs
20 represent environmental attributes for Arizona REST compliance purposes and for other
21 purposes.

22 A.A.C. R14-2-1804 E states that “If an Affected Utility trades or sells
23 environmental pollution reduction credits or any other environmental attributes
24 associated with kWh produced by an Eligible Renewable Energy Resource, the Affected
25 Utility may not apply Renewable Energy Credits derived from that same kWh to satisfy

1 the requirements of these rules.” This means that the RECs used to satisfy the REST
2 requirements must include the environmental attributes.

3 TEP’s 2013 Up-Front Incentive Renewable Energy Credit Purchase Agreement
4 (Leased Residential Grid-Tied Solar PV), Section 1.8, defines RECs as follows:

5 *“REC” means any and all environmental credits, attributes and benefits,*
6 *including greenhouse gas or emissions reductions and any associated*
7 *credits, environmental air quality credits, offsets, allowances and benefits*
8 *howsoever entitled, actual SO₂, NO_x, CO₂, CO, Carbon, VOC, mercury,*
9 *and other emissions avoided, credits towards achieving local, national or*
10 *international renewable portfolio standards, green tags, and any and all*
11 *other green energy or other environmental benefits associated with the*
12 *generation of renewable energy (regardless of how any present or future*
13 *law or regulation attributes or allocates such characteristics), including*
14 *those created under the REST.*

15 In its business dealings, TEP does not exhibit the confusion it seeks to create in
16 this docket. TEP’s definition of a REC does not distinguish between compliance markets
17 and voluntary markets – it applies to both. The definition also recognizes that the RECs
18 represent non-kWh features of renewable energy.

19 More generally, EPA states that a REC “represents the property rights to the
20 environmental, social, and other nonpower qualities of renewable electricity generation.
21 A REC, and its associated attributes and benefits, can be sold separately from the
22 underlying physical electricity associated with a renewable-based generation source.”
23 (<http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm>).

24 Further, despite TEP’s assertion otherwise (TEP/UNS Initial Post-Hearing Brief,
25 starting on page 16), customers clearly have property rights associated with RECs (Berry
surrebuttal, p. 4 starting on line 24). The rights include the ability to legitimately claim
the environmental attributes listed by TEP. It is those rights that are transferred in REC

1 markets (WRA/Vote Solar Opening Brief, starting on p. 10), including TEP's acquisition
2 of RECs through its credit purchase agreements.

3 **B. Acquisition of RECs.**

4 APS, TEP, and Staff criticize WRA and Vote Solar for proposing an auction
5 method or standard offer¹ method to acquire RECs (TEP Initial Post-Hearing Brief,
6 starting on p. 23; Staff Opening Brief, p. 11, APS Closing Brief, p. 6). Their briefs
7 indicate that an auction or standard offer present administrative difficulties, have
8 uncertain costs, or cost ratepayers too much. These criticisms are unfounded or distort
9 what is actually happening.

10 While we agree that utilities should seek to obtain resources at the best price for
11 ratepayers, Staff's Track and Monitor approach and the original Track and Record
12 approach both try to get something for nothing by meeting the distributed generation
13 requirement or reducing the distributed generation requirement by claiming RECs for
14 regulatory purposes that utilities have not purchased. These proposals devalue RECs
15 owned by customers or others as discussed in the section on double counting.

16 To obtain RECs at the lowest price supported by the market, WRA and Vote Solar
17 have recommended either an auction approach or a standard offer. Both approaches are
18 quite workable as they continue existing practices. Staff's concerns about a vague
19 process (Staff Opening Brief, p. 11) are easily addressed. The Commission has used a
20 standard offer approach for years by setting an incentive rate for the acquisition of RECs
21 and Staff has reviewed utility incentive proposals. Indeed, Staff has recommended
22 incentive levels many times and has experience with dynamic REC market conditions.

24 ¹ Note that Vote Solar's Standard Offer proposal encourages participants to offer RECs at
25 a price lower than the standard offer, in which case the lowest price RECs would be
acquired first. See Gilliam Direct Testimony, page 15.

1 Moreover, APS has used an auction approach for performance based incentives so there
2 is a track record of successful implementation. This is not a voyage into outer space – it's
3 a well understood journey over familiar territory.

4 If a utility needs additional RECs to comply with the REST, an auction or standard
5 offer approach to purchasing RECs will reflect the level of incentive needed. If
6 incentives are not needed, REC prices will approach zero so there is little impact on
7 ratepayers when utilities acquire the RECs they need to comply with the distributed
8 generation requirement under these circumstances.

9 To alleviate concerns over market power or uncertain budgets for REC
10 acquisition, the Commission could cap the REC price paid by utilities and set a budget
11 annually for each utility during its review of REST implementation plans. (Berry
12 surrebuttal p.3, starting on line 1; WRA/Vote Solar Opening Brief, p. 13). Staff, the solar
13 industry, and other stakeholders can continue to provide advice to the Commission on
14 setting a standard offer or developing an auction.

15 TEP/UNS (Initial Post-Hearing Brief, p. 25) criticizes WRA for recommending
16 that the utilities, Staff, and stakeholders work together to develop an auction approach on
17 the grounds that such collaboration would be cumbersome. APS held such a "technical
18 conference" when it devised its performance based incentives several years ago. The
19 discussion was useful and took only a few hours.² All the parties would benefit from a
20 collaborative design for an auction or standard offer. Doing so need not be burdensome
21 as experience with APS has demonstrated. But not undertaking a collaborative approach
22 could result in protracted reviews of utilities' individual implementation plans with
23 regard to how the standard offer should be set or how an auction should be conducted.

24
25 ² Staff also conducted a series of workshops on developing the uniform credit purchase
programs as indicated in WRA/Vote Solar's opening brief, p. 14, starting on line 1.

1 **C. Double Counting**

2 Staff (Opening Brief, p. 8, starting on line 16), TEP (Initial Post-Hearing Brief,
3 starting on page 9, line 4, and APS (Closing Brief starting on page 4, line 9) argue that
4 Staff's Track and Monitor approach does not double count RECs. We disagree for the
5 reasons set forth in our opening brief (starting on p. 17, line 15; also Berry rebuttal,
6 starting on p. 2, line 32 to p. 3, line 10). Adjusting the distributed generation requirement
7 downward as proposed in the Track and Monitor approach constitutes a claim on RECs
8 without the utilities actually acquiring the RECs from the REC owners. This situation
9 leaves the REC owner (e.g., a customer with a rooftop solar energy system) in a position
10 where he or she could not legitimately sell the RECs in the voluntary market nor use the
11 RECs to meet his or her own renewable energy goals. Thus, the Track and Monitor
12 approach is unsuitable as a Commission policy because it creates a double counting
13 dilemma.

14 Moreover, TEP and APS have been careful in their acquisition of RECs to be sure
15 that the RECs they have acquired are not also claimed by another party (Berry Direct
16 Testimony, p. 7, starting on line 2). Thus, TEP and APS are sufficiently concerned about
17 double counting that they address the issue explicitly in their credit purchase agreements.
18 Double counting is a real issue to the utilities and it should be a real issue to the
19 Commission.

20 **D. The DG Carve out**

21 WRA and Vote Solar agree with Staff that the DG carve-out should be retained.
22 We disagree with TEP/UNS's recommendation that the DG carve-out be eliminated (TEP
23 Initial Post-Hearing Brief, pp. 26, 30).

24 The fact that incentives are close to zero today is not sufficient reason to abandon
25 the DG carve out as the Commission may alter net metering practices and change rate

1 designs, both of which could make distributed solar energy economically unattractive in
2 the absence of incentives (Berry, direct testimony, p. 7, starting on line 35). The
3 Commission may wish to direct utilities to offer incentives for distributed generation in
4 the future.

5 **CONCLUSIONS**

6 Several approaches have been recommended by the parties on how to meet the
7 REST distributed generation requirements in the absence of incentives. The Track and
8 Monitor approach proposed by Staff and supported by APS and TEP/UNS attempts to
9 create a system in which utilities do not pay for RECs but still claim the RECs for the
10 purpose of adjusting the distributed generation requirement downward. Thus, Track and
11 Monitor (and similar approaches) creates a double-counting catch-22 that devalues RECs.

12 WRA and Vote Solar have proposed that the utilities continue to acquire RECs as
13 needed to meet the distributed generation requirement. The acquisition process should be
14 designed to obtain the lowest cost for ratepayers and we support either an auction or
15 regularly updated standard offer to accomplish this. If incentives are rarely needed, REC
16 prices will be close to zero and have minimal impact on ratepayers. The Commission can
17 oversee the auction/standard offer approach by setting annual budgets and a cap on REC
18 prices as it sees fit. WRA's and Vote Solar's recommendations do not create a double
19 counting problem. Moreover, the auction and standard offer approaches are
20 continuations of existing practices, not untested ideas.

21 Lastly, Staff and other parties have recommended, often as a second choice,
22 annual consideration of a waiver of the distributed generation requirement by the
23 Commission. An occasional waiver may be warranted, but it should not become a
24 regular occurrence. The Commission has a Renewable Energy Standard and it ought to
25 be implemented. The best way to implement the REST is for utilities to legitimately

1 acquire RECs from customers, when the utilities need the RECs, and to do so using a
2 method that minimizes costs for ratepayers. That method is an auction or standard offer.

3 DATED this 12th day of September, 2013.

4
5 ARIZONA CENTER FOR LAW IN
6 THE PUBLIC INTEREST

7 By 

8 Timothy M. Hogan

9 202 E. McDowell Rd., Suite 153

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12 and The Vote Solar Initiative

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
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PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO MODIFY
THE RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD
RULES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACC
DECISION NO. 74365.

DOCKET NO. RE-00000C-14-0112

COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR
RESOURCE SOLUTIONS ON STAFF'S
PROPOSED OPTIONS

The Center for Resource Solutions (CRS) appreciates the opportunity to provide information to the Arizona Corporation Commission (Commission) as it considers the issues brought forward in this proceeding. CRS is a nonprofit organization, and, as such, has limited resources and is not able to devote the resources necessary to become a party to this proceeding. The issues being considered in this proceeding are important to the future of renewable energy in Arizona, and CRS is appreciative of the opportunity to be able to share its perspectives through the public comment process.

The Utilities Division Staff (Staff) have provided a compliance filing per Decision No. 74365 that briefly describes seven options to modify the Renewable Energy Standard Tariff (REST). Below, CRS provides comments on these options as well as on the Recommended Opinion and Order

Recommended Opinion and Order

CRS could support the original Recommended Opinion and Order's (ROO) recommendation of a temporary waiver in the case that the Commission articulates in more detail proposed criteria governing such a waiver. As it is currently presented, the process that the Commission will use to determine whether a requested waiver is in the public interest and does not result in increased risk of double counting renewable energy generation or attributes (RECs) is not sufficiently clear for CRS to comment on potential double counting risks. Staff's proposed criteria, which was praised by the Administrative Law Judge in the ROO, is problematic as it included the proposal: "recognizing the reality regarding how much electric load is actually being met with renewable energy" and doing so by looking at the kWh generated from all DE facilities, *regardless* of REC ownership. Unless other criteria are proposed, or other methods of demonstrating this criterion are adopted, implementation of the Staff's Alternative Track and Monitor proposal could result in double counting and/or effectively taking, without compensation, the value of RECs retained by DG system owners. In general, measuring of supply and

generation does not create double counting/claims problems for renewable energy use claims (which require REC ownership). Issues arise when counting of renewable energy supply/generation is equated with renewable electricity use, such as serving "electric load" without RECs also being required to substantiate the use of renewable energy.

Staff's Proposed Options

I. Track and Monitor

CRS strongly urges the commission not to accept Track and Monitor. This option devalues the REST and private voluntary actions. Counting generation as if it were providing renewable energy to load (and thereby reducing the REST) clearly signals that the benefits of that renewable energy generation, including the value of the RECs, are being counted for REST purposes. This would significantly impact the value of the affected RECs for use or sale within and outside the state and reduce the attractiveness of investment from the private sector in Arizona renewables. Such a proposal changes the REST from a minimum level of renewable energy activity in the state to a cap, effectively eliminating the ability for individuals and the private sector to "make a difference" in the amount of renewable energy in the state.

The voluntary market exists as a way for people and organizations to make purchases that are above and beyond what is required by law/used for REST compliance purposes. If the REC is claimed by the REST compliance market then it has no value in the voluntary market thereby reducing the incentive for private investment in solar generation in Arizona.

II. Process Where Utility Would Purchase Least Cost RECs or kWh

CRS strongly supports this option, so long as it is made clear that renewable kWh are those kWh that still have the REC associated with it. It should also be clear that the least cost REC will still need to meet the REST eligibility requirements, including, but not limited to, resource type, location and size.

III. Creation of Maximum Conventional Energy Requirement

CRS does not support this option due to the complexity, administrative burden, and the ease of gaming. It would be very difficult to achieve the goals of the REST with this option. If this option is selected, electricity generation from renewable energy facilities (kWhs) that does not have RECs associated with it should not be considered "non-conventional" as the renewable attributes are contained within the REC and belong to the REC owner. Such kWh are called "null power" and best practices in electricity generation tracking are that such electricity be considered to have attributes equal to the profile of average system energy (e.g, NERC region or state).

IV. Mandatory Upfront Incentives ("UFI")

CRS supports the option of Mandatory Upfront Incentives, if the provision that the UFI mandate and/or DG/DE mandate can be waived if it is determined that there is sufficient DG being installed is deleted. This provision as it stands raises the same risks as the prior Track and Monitor proposal.

V. REC Transfer Associated with Net Metering

While using net metering tariffs as a procurement mechanism for RECs is a proposal to consider, net metering customers should be given a choice of whether or not to relinquish their RECs. The RECs should not be taken in exchange for the service that the utility is already required to provide without compensation and agreement by the REC owner. Net metering customers should be paid full value for their RECs if they voluntarily decide to transfer them to the utility through the net metering tariff. A policy wherein all net metering customers are required to transfer their RECs to utilities would reduce private investment into DG/DE in Arizona, as those RECs would not be usable by the installation owner, the homeowner/system host, or any third party.

VI. Recovery of DG/DE Costs Through the Standard Rate Case Process

A waiver of the DG/DE requirement based on sufficient DG being installed in the Utilities service area has the same risks as track and monitor and any other proposal that equates generation with REST compliance.

VII. Track and Record

CRS strongly urges the commission to reject Track and Record. The option would likely constitute a claim on all Arizona privately-owned RECs, even though it purports not to. The option inaccurately states that the null kWh is being reported for informational purposes only, however the in-state generation is the only type of information specifically referenced for the Commission to rely on. This information is clearly being used to determine compliance.

CRS appreciates the Staff's desire to preserve REC values for Arizona citizens and organizations who have invested in DE. However, any use of renewable energy generation (as in the Track and Monitor proposal), its attributes and/or associated RECs toward the REST constitutes a claim, eroding the value of an associated voluntary market REC. Such is the case even if the associated RECs contractually remain with the installer or generation owner. The statement "Such REC may not be considered used or extinguished by any entity without approval and proper documentation from the entity creating the REC." will not alleviate concerns about REC value for buyers of RECs who wish to use them outside of the Arizona REST, including other state RPS markets and in the voluntary market for RECs.

The Voluntary Market in Arizona

The Arizona voluntary market exists and is vibrant. As noted in Ms. Martin's testimony, in 2011, Green-e Energy verification data demonstrates that there are thousands of customers voluntarily purchasing renewable energy in Arizona, and Arizona renewable generators generated 29,997 MWh that were sold into the voluntary REC market.¹ There may also be other voluntary purchasers in Arizona and renewable energy generation sold into the voluntary market from in-state generators that are not Green-e Energy certified.

Some examples of sellers in the voluntary market include Arizona Public Service Company, whose Green Choice Program is Green-e Energy certified. Also Salt River

¹ Center for Resource Solutions, data aggregated from Green-e Energy verification of 2011 certified sales.

Project's EarthWise program is certified by Green-e Energy. According to the EPA's Green Power Partnership list, voluntary renewable energy market purchasers in Arizona include: Apollo Group, Inc., University of Phoenix, Arid Zone Trees, Arizona Lithographers, ConserVentures, Evolution Beauty Technologies, Inc., Forever Resorts/Big Bend Resorts, Chisos Mountain Lodge, Forever Resorts / Grand Canyon North Rim, LLC, International Student Exchange Cards, Inc., and Prime Time Thermographics.

The primary market in the United States for voluntary RECs is for Green-e Energy Certified RECs. According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and verification data obtained through annual Green-e Energy reporting, Green-e Energy certifies and verifies roughly two-thirds of the U.S. voluntary retail renewable energy sales overall and more than ninety percent of U.S. voluntary retail renewable energy certificate (REC) sales.²

Undisputed ownership of and title to renewable energy attributes, including REC ownership, the claim to own or use renewable energy, and the ability to sell that claim, including to parties outside of Arizona, is critical to Arizona businesses and individuals who invest in on-site renewable energy. The adoption of policy by the Commission that brings into question those rights will significantly reduce the value of renewable energy for DE owners in the state and will hinder future economic growth in this sector in Arizona.

Arizona citizens and businesses have an interest in having clear title to the property rights associated with renewable energy attributes, RECs and claims associated with their onsite or owned renewable energy generation. As an example of this, both the U.S. Government and Wal-Mart have expressed such directly to the Commission as parties in this proceeding. In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency wrote to the Commission and expressed similar concerns. Proposals before the Commission, including Track and Monitor and Track and Record, appear to be intended to meet the REST requirements by "counting" or "monitoring" renewable energy generation by facilities owned by third parties (not utility owned) and using that "counting" or "monitoring" to determine a utility's REST compliance. CRS's Green-e Energy program rules on which Ms. Martin offered testimony are just one example of how adoption of such policies will be viewed by market and regulatory entities as a claim on renewable energy attributes, including RECs.

For the U.S. national voluntary market and several state renewable energy regulatory markets that Arizona solar generators are eligible to participate in (including California, Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina and Missouri) such counting threatens these property rights and will likely preclude Arizona generation owners from being able to access these markets. In addition, for companies like Wal-Mart and others in Arizona that own on-site generation, adoption of such policies by the Commission will erode the benefits these companies expected to receive from their on-site generation and could preclude them from using that generation to qualify for recognition programs, like the

² National Renewable Energy Laboratory, *Market Brief: Status of the Voluntary Renewable Energy Certificate Market (2011 Data)* available at <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/56128.pdf> at 5; and Center for Resource Solutions, *2011 Green-e Verification Report* <http://www.green-e.org/publications.shtml> at 4-6, (accessed June 5, 2013).

EPA Green Power Partnership, or from reporting that renewable generation for other recognition or sustainability reporting programs.

Conclusion

A decision by the Commission that effectively counts renewable energy generation to meet the REST will have negative consequences for Arizona generation owners.

This will be the case even if the adopted language uses alternative terminology in an attempt to both preserve private rights to renewable energy generation and count that same generation towards a utility's obligations under the REST. Any policy that creates confusion as to the ownership rights of Arizona generators over their RECs and/or renewable energy attributes or claim to owning or using renewable energy generation will only result in a loss of value for DE owners in the state and reduce economic opportunities for Arizona citizens and businesses who wish to claim or sell their renewable energy generation ownership rights.

The Commission should adopt a decision that uses clear language to explain the intent of the policy

Such language should include whether or not any action by the utilities or Commission, including but not limited to tracking or monitoring or other types of reporting with regard to Arizona solar generation, is being used as a basis to determine REST compliance. In the interest of clarity, maintaining consistency with and access to the overall renewable energy markets in which Arizona generators can participate, and maintaining strong property rights to renewable energy attributes and claims for Arizona renewable energy owners, CRS urges the Commission to maintain its current policy to require the utilities to acquire RECs to demonstrate REST compliance.

CRS joins Wal-Mart, the U.S. Department of Defense, Western Resource Advocates and Vote Solar and SEIA as well as non-parties such as the US Environmental Protection Agency have also requested that the Commission consider the impacts of double counting on the voluntary market in Arizona.

Thank you,



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I. INTRODUCTION

The following is the Solar Energy Industries Association's ("SEIA") response to the Post-Hearing Briefs filed by Staff, Arizona Public Service Corporation ("APS"), and Tucson Electric Power Company and UNS Electric, Inc. ("TEP/UNS"). SEIA¹ urges the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") to consider the issues presented while keeping in mind that the intent of the Renewable Energy Standard Tariff Rules ("REST" or "REST Rules") is to develop a sustainable renewable energy market.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Parties Agree that the DE Carve-Out Should Not be Eliminated at this Time

At this stage in the proceeding, no party asserts that the distributed energy REST requirement ("DE carve-out") should be eliminated at this time.² Some parties, such as TEP/UNS and NRG Solar LLC, recommend a rulemaking once it is shown that incentives no longer drive the market.³ Further, APS has abandoned its original position to remove the DE carve-out and has adopted Staff's Track and Monitor proposal.⁴

However, no party asserts that the DE carve-out should be eliminated at this time. Based on this unanimous agreement, and because the impact of incentives on DE adoption is currently unknown, the Commission should not eliminate the DE carve-out at this time.

B. The Commission Should Not Adopt Staff's Track and Monitor Proposal Because it Will Harm Arizona Ratepayers and Drive Away Investment in Arizona's Economy by Allowing Utilities to Count Distributed Energy Towards Compliance Without Compensating System Owners

Throughout this proceeding, parties representing Arizona ratepayers and the Arizona solar market have clearly stated that the Commission should not allow utilities to count

¹ The comments contained in this filing represent the position of SEIA as an organization, but not necessarily the views of any particular member with respect to any issue.

² APS Post Hearing Brief at 2; TEP/UNS Post Hearing Brief at 26-27; Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 12; NRG Post-Hearing Brief at 12; Western Resource Advocates/Vote Solar Post-Hearing Brief at 21; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Post-Hearing Brief at 3; Kevin Koch Post-Hearing Brief at 4; SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 4; Note that Dept of Defense/Federal Executive Agencies Post-Hearing Brief did not weigh in on this issue.

³ TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 2; NRG Solar LLC Post-Hearing Brief at 12

⁴ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 2

1 generation of distributed energy without compensating system owners.⁵ Doing so would be
2 harmful to Arizona ratepayers and will drive away investment in Arizona's economy.⁶

3 **i. Staff Recognizes that Track and Monitor May Result in Counting**
4 **Distributed Energy Towards the REST Without Compensating System**
5 **Owners, and Thus May Not be a Viable Option**

6 In its Post-Hearing Brief, Staff continues to promote its Track and Monitor proposal.
7 Under Track and Monitor, a utility's DE requirement under the REST Rules is reduced on a kWh
8 per kWh basis for DE produced in the utility's service territory where no transfer of Renewable
9 Energy Credits ("RECs") takes place.⁷ However, Staff indicates that if the Commission
10 determines that Track and Monitor constitutes a count of distributed energy ("DE") without
11 compensating system owners, Staff withdraws its support of Track and Monitor and recommends
12 a temporary waiver of the DE carve-out requirements.⁸

13 Throughout this proceeding, ratepayer advocates, solar developers, policy experts, REC
14 certifiers, governmental agencies, and trade associations that are invested in Arizona's solar
15 market and economy have all echoed the same message: distributed energy that is credited
16 towards compliance, whether by crediting DE to the REST or by a reduction of the REST, is
17 considered counted and the system owners must be compensated.⁹

18 Track and Monitor counts DE by reducing the REST requirement and fails to compensate
19 system owners. Therefore, Track and Monitor should not be adopted.

20 **ii. APS Fails to Recognize that Double Counting is a Significant Issue that Will**
21 **Harm Ratepayers and Drive Away Investment in Arizona's Economy by**

22
23 ⁵ Fellman Cross at 517-520; Baker Cross at 378; Cordova Cross at 401-402; Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Huber
24 Cross at 594; Vote Solar/Western Resource Advocates Post-Hearing Brief at 8; TEP/UNS Direct at 7; SEIA
25 Rebuttal Testimony at 1; NRG Post-Hearing Brief at 9; SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 10; DOD/FEA Post-Hearing
26 Brief at 7; Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 9; RUCO Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Vote Solar/Western Resource Advocates
27 Post-Hearing Brief at 18; Martin Cross at 810; Wal-Mart Post-Hearing Brief at 5; See Renewable Energy Markets
28 Association Letter to the Commission April 29, 2013

⁶ For further discussion of this issue, see SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 8

⁷ Gray Direct at 7; Gray Cross at 694; Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 3

⁸ Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 9

⁹ NRG Post-Hearing Brief at 9; SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 10; DOD/FEA Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Staff Post-
Hearing Brief at 9; RUCO Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Vote Solar/Western Resource Advocates Post-Hearing Brief at
18; Martin Cross at 810; Wal-Mart Post-Hearing Brief at 5; See Renewable Energy Markets Association Letter to
the Commission April 29, 2013

1 **Allowing Utilities to Count DE Towards Compliance Without Compensating**
2 **System Owners**

3 APS attempts to minimize the importance of properly tracking DE and adequately
4 compensating system owners by asserting that concern over double counting is not a sufficient
5 reason to reject Staff's Track and Monitor proposal.¹⁰ As explained in SEIA's Post-Hearing
6 Brief, double counting is a significant concern because it directly impacts Arizona ratepayers and
7 will drive away investment in Arizona's economy.¹¹

8 First, APS argues Arizona DE REC owners cannot sell their RECs because no market
9 exists.¹² This argument is not borne out by the facts. It has been established in this proceeding
10 there are state and national REC markets which are open to Arizona REC holders.¹³ In addition,
11 Arizona's compliance market is a significant driver of investment and economic growth in
12 Arizona.¹⁴

13 Citing R14-2-1803(C), APS also argues that it would be unlawful to sell RECs to non-
14 utility buyers.¹⁵ Nowhere does this R14-2-1803(C) state that Arizona DE RECs cannot be sold
15 to non-utility purchasers. In fact, several witnesses testified that RECs can be sold to non-utility
16 third parties.¹⁶

17 Third, APS argues that it is unclear what impact double counting would have on
18 Arizona's market because other markets, such as Hawaii, do allow double counting.¹⁷ While it is
19 possible that Arizona's market would survive a policy that allows counting DE without
20 compensating system owners, given the amount of concern over double counting from a variety
21 of parties who actively participate in Arizona's solar and REC markets, it seems a risk the
22 Commission should not take. Further, the Commission has plenty of time and options available
23 to it, and does not need to make a rash decision based on speculation by APS.

24
25 ¹⁰ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 4

26 ¹¹ SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 8

27 ¹² APS Post-Hearing Brief at 4

28 ¹³ Martin Cross at 809-811, 821; 856; R14-2-1803(C); See CRS Letter to the ACC dated May 21, 2013

¹⁴ Ahsing Cross at 422-423, 440; Fellman Cross at 517-520

¹⁵ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 4; A.A.C R14-2-1803(C)

¹⁶ Fellman Cross at 517-520; Martin Direct at 809-810, 856; Ahsing Cross at 440

¹⁷ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 4

1 Fourth, APS argues that the double counting issue can be settled with a “statement of
2 intent.”¹⁸ However, APS never goes on to explain exactly how such a statement would settle the
3 concern over double counting. If anything, APS merely misconstrues CRS’ testimony on this
4 point, in which Ms. Martin explained the intent of the rules must be to ensure that renewable
5 energy is counted for only one purpose, and that system owners are adequately compensated for
6 their DE production.¹⁹

7 Fifth, APS ignores the potential impact on the private property rights of Arizonans. If a
8 solution is implemented that, either intentionally or unintentionally, counts RECs without
9 compensating the owner of the solar system, that solution will result in depriving the owner of
10 the system of his property right interest in the REC. SEIA suggests that the Commission should
11 favor policies that do not deprive private citizens and ratepayers of their private property without
12 just compensation.

13 Finally, APS questions whether CRS should be consulted on these issues at all because of
14 the fact that CRS is based in California. APS argues that because CRS is an entity that is based
15 in the state of California, if the Commission agrees with CRS that Track and Monitor will result
16 in a counting of RECs, the Commission would really be modeling Arizona’s energy goals after
17 California and the priorities of a California non-profit.²⁰ The fallacy of this argument should be
18 immediately apparent. This argument misconstrues the double counting issue and CRS’ role in
19 this proceeding entirely. The issue of properly accounting for renewable energy generated in
20 Arizona is an Arizona issue that directly impacts Arizona’s ratepayers and economy. CRS is a
21 REC policy expert that deals with REC markets throughout the country and certifies 90% of all
22 voluntary RECs traded in the country while also certifying RECs for APS itself.²¹ It is logical to
23 consult the leading experts on REC markets in a proceeding centered on REC policy, especially
24 considering the potential impact on Arizona’s ratepayers. APS’s attempt to play politics with
25 CRS’s place of business should be rejected. No matter where CRS is headquartered, the record
26 clearly reflects it is the expert in the nation on REC certification. In fact, aside from CRS, no

27 ¹⁸ Id.

28 ¹⁹ Id.; Martin Cross at 825

²⁰ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 5

²¹ Martin Cross at 865-866; Bernosky Cross at 118

1 other expert in the certification of RECs testified at this hearing. The expert opinion on this issue
2 is simply uncontroverted by any other experts.

3 APS attempts to minimize the importance of properly tracking DE and adequately
4 compensating system owners. However, these issues are fundamental to ensuring the integrity of
5 RECs, a functioning solar market, and protecting Arizona ratepayers. Based on the
6 overwhelming evidence from the only expert to testify on the subject, Track and Monitor counts
7 distributed energy towards the REST without compensating system owners, and therefore should
8 not be adopted.

9 **iii. TEP/UNS Fails to Acknowledge that Track and Monitor Will Harm**
10 **Ratepayers and Drive Away Investment in Arizona's Economy by Allowing**
11 **Utilities to Count DE Towards Compliance Without Compensating System**
12 **Owners**

13 In its Initial Brief, TEP/UNS undertakes a long convoluted analysis to arrive at the
14 conclusion that Track and Monitor will not negatively impact Arizona utility customers because
15 it does not count DE towards the REST, a position that is at odds with the only REC policy
16 expert that testified in this matter.

17 First, TEP/UNS argues that Arizona RECs need not be certified by CRS to comply with
18 the REST, pointing to differences between the compliance and voluntary markets such as
19 "bundling."²² Further, TEP/UNS argues that the definition of RECs in voluntary and compliance
20 markets vary.²³ These assertions have no bearing on whether Track and Monitor counts DE
21 towards the REST. Under Track and Monitor, utilities are relieved of a compliance requirement
22 for the DE generated in their service territory. Most parties to this proceeding, representative of
23 a wide swath of Arizona's ratepayers, solar customers, and policy experts, agree that reducing a
24 utility's compliance requirement by crediting DE generation in its territory constitutes a count
25 and requires compensation of the system owner.²⁴ Most importantly, the only expert on REC

26 ²² TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 9

27 ²³ Id.

28 ²⁴ NRG Post-Hearing Brief at 9; SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 10; DOD/FEA Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Staff Post-
Hearing Brief at 9; RUCO Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Vote Solar/Western Resource Advocates Post-Hearing Brief at
18; Martin Cross at 810; Wal-Mart Post-Hearing Brief at 5; See Renewable Energy Markets Association Letter to
the Commission April 29, 2013

1 certification to testify in this matter concluded that Track and Monitor would result in a counting
2 of the solar customer's RECs without compensation.²⁵

3 Second, TEP/UNS argues that Track and Monitor does not constitute double counting
4 because under Track and Monitor utilities do not claim DE for compliance.²⁶ Once again, this
5 argument is contrary to a widely held perspective that has been established again and again in
6 this proceeding: crediting distributed energy towards compliance, either by crediting the energy
7 to the REST with RECs or by reducing REST requirements according to DE generation, is a
8 count of DE that requires compensation of the system owner.²⁷

9 TEP/UNS goes on to argue that under Track and Monitor, DE's "renewable attributes"
10 are not counted towards compliance under the REST Rules where there is no REC transfer.²⁸
11 Rather, the utilities' REST requirements are reduced according to production of DE for which
12 TEP/UNS does not acquire RECs.²⁹ TEP/UNS is making a distinction without a difference. As
13 TEP/UNS states in its own argument, "...RECs that the utility acquires from the customer or
14 system owner fit the REC definition under the REST rules – and do represent energy derived
15 from renewable sources".³⁰ Thus, by TEP/UNS' own admission, reducing the REST
16 requirement by DE production is the equivalent of counting renewable energy towards the
17 REST. RECs not only represent energy production, RECs represent production of renewable
18 energy with renewable attributes. In fact, this is the very purpose of the REST – to promote
19 installation of energy with renewable attributes. Therefore, whether the REST requirement is
20 reduced under Track and Record or met through RECs, renewable energy is being produced and
21 used to meet the utility's REST requirement. Reducing a utility's REST requirement by tracking
22 DE in its territory is counting that energy towards the REST. This is why the non-utility parties,

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25 ²⁵ Martin Cross at 810

26 ²⁶ TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 10-11

27 ²⁷ NRG Post-Hearing Brief at 9; SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 10; DOD/FEA Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Staff Post-
28 Hearing Brief at 9; RUCO Post-Hearing Brief at 7; Vote Solar/Western Resource Advocates Post-Hearing Brief at
29 18; Martin Cross at 810; Wal-Mart Post-Hearing Brief at 5; *See* Renewable Energy Markets Association Letter to
30 the Commission April 29, 2013

²⁸ TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 11

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 10-11 at 9

1 including the only REC policy expert to testify agree that Track and Monitor counts distributed
2 energy towards the REST without adequately compensating system owners.

3 TEP/UNS goes on to argue that policies from CRS' Green-e Program, the Federal Trade
4 Commission (FTC), and Western Renewable Energy Generation Information System
5 ("WREGIS") do not apply to Arizona's compliance market and therefore are irrelevant to this
6 proceeding.³¹ Once again, TEP/UNS either misses the point or is attempting to distract the
7 Commission from the issue at hand: if solar customers and investors cannot sell their Arizona
8 RECs to help finance their solar projects because the utilities are counting the RECs without
9 compensation, they will look to invest in other solar markets.³² These investors and customers
10 look to organizations that are highly knowledgeable about REC markets, such as CRS, the FTC,
11 and WREGIS to help determine the validity of RECs in a given market.³³ Therefore, the policies
12 of these organizations carry value and can be used to help guide the Commission's decision on
13 this very important and technical issue.

14 Finally, TEP/UNS argues that Track and Monitor does not amount to a taking, and that it
15 is aligned with the intent of the REST Rules.³⁴ Contrary to TEP/UNS' assertion, customers do
16 have property rights in their RECs, and the Commission should not adopt any policy that takes
17 ratepayer property, RECs or otherwise, without just compensation.³⁵ Further, under Arizona's
18 REST rules, utilities cannot take credit for distributed energy generated by their customers
19 without a REC transaction. Section R14-2-1803(C) of the REST Rules states that RECs must be
20 transferred through a transaction. This helps to incentivize investment and protect Arizona
21 ratepayers. To allow a utility to comply through a reduction in its REST requirement without
22 compensating system owners, rather than by crediting RECs to the REST, is to allow the utilities
23 to create and exploit a loophole that undermines the intent of the REST Rules. Ratepayers will
24 not be properly incentivized or compensated if utilities are allowed to comply through a
25 reduction in the REST without purchasing RECs or otherwise compensating system owners.

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27 ³¹ Id. at 13-16

³² SEIA Post-Hearing Brief at 9-10

³³ Baker Cross at 385; Cordova Cross at 406

³⁴ TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 5; 16

³⁵ See Renewable Energy Markets Association Letter to the Commission April 29, 2013; Martin Cross at 812

1 Track and Monitor counts distributed energy towards the REST without compensating
2 system owners, and therefore should not be adopted.

3 **C. The Commission Should Either Take No Action or Issue The Utilities Annual**
4 **Waivers As Needed**

5 The Commission need not take any action at this time because the utilities are in
6 compliance through 2013 in some market segments, and for several years in other segments.³⁶
7 There are other proceedings that should be resolved before the DE compliance issue, and the
8 Commission can afford to wait.³⁷ APS, TEP/UNS, and Staff assert that waiting will involve
9 more cost and administrative burden.³⁸ However, a permanent decision may prove much more
10 costly than waiting should the DE market falter.

11 If the Commission chooses to take action, it should issue an annual waiver to the utilities
12 as needed and require the utilities to report DE installations for informational purposes only.³⁹

13 The waiver approach has the following advantages:

- 14 1. An annual waiver is widely supported, including support from Staff and TEP/UNS
- 15 2. An annual waiver will achieve Staff's goals
- 16 3. An annual waiver will allow the Commission to monitor the DE market
- 17 4. An annual waiver can be written so as to avoid double counting
- 18 5. An annual waiver creates no additional uncertainty, cost, or administrative burden
- 19 6. An annual waiver is provided for in Section R14-2-1816 of the REST Rules
- 20 7. An annual waiver satisfies any compliance issues the utilities may face

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³⁶ Bernosky Cross at 103, 151; Tilghman Cross at 201, 226, 252, 278

26 ³⁷ Gillian Cross at 283; Bernosky Cross at 77-78; Huber Cross at 636; Gray Cross at 702; Cullen Hit Direct at
27 9; Barry Direct at 450

³⁸ APS Post-Hearing Brief at 5; TEP/UNS Post-Hearing Brief at 18; Staff Post-Hearing Brief at 12; Gray Rebuttal
28 Testimony at 3

³⁹ It should be noted that APS does not even address the proposal that annual waivers be issued and mischaracterizes
the world of options presented to the Commission.

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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS

BOB STUMP - Chairman
GARY PIERCE
BRENDA BURNS
BOB BURNS
SUSAN BITTER SMITH

IN THE MATTER OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF UPDATED GREEN POWER RATE SCHEDULE GPS-1, GPS-2, AND GPS-3.	DOCKET NO. E-01345A-10-0394
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR APPROVAL OF ITS 2013 RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION FOR RESET OF RENEWABLE ENERGY ADJUSTOR.	DOCKET NO. E-01345A-12-0290
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR APPROVAL OF ITS 2013 RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN AND REQUEST FOR RESET OF ITS RENEWABLE ENERGY ADJUSTOR.	DOCKET NO. E-01933A-12-0296
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF UNS ELECTIC, INC. FOR APPROVAL OF ITS 2013 RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN AND REQUEST FOR RESET OF ITS RENEWABLE ENERGY ADJUSTOR.	DOCKET NO. E-04204A-12-0297

**THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' BRIEF**

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Arizona has established its Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff ("REST") rules, requiring utilities to serve a percentage of their customers load with renewable energy. The REST rules additionally require that a portion of this renewable energy come from commercial and residential customer sited generation sources. Renewable Energy Credits – defined in the rules as "the unit created to track kWh derived from an Eligible Renewable

Energy Resource” – are used to track compliance with the REST requirements.¹ Traditionally, utilities have paid incentives to obtain the RECs derived from customer sited generation.

The United States Department of Defense and all other Federal Executive Agencies (“DoD/FEA”) have their own requirements and goals, established by Federal statute and Executive Order, to serve a certain percentage of their total electric consumption from renewable energy sources. Pursuant to Department of Energy Guidelines, DoD/FEA uses its RECs for compliance, or to make projects economically viable by transferring them for value. RECs that are used to meet state requirements cannot be counted toward DoD/FEA’s Federal compliance requirements or transferred for value; if RECs are claimed for two purposes, i.e. for a utility’s REST requirements and Federal requirements, double counting would occur.

To meet their Federal requirements and goals, DoD/FEA have made significant investments in renewable energy projects in Arizona, including: The Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) has invested over \$50 million to develop approximately 10.6 MW of solar photovoltaic generating capacity, with future investments planned; a 14.5 MW solar photovoltaic project is currently being constructed on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base; and the Army is planning construction of approximately 20 MW of solar photovoltaic generating capacity at Fort Huachuca and/or Yuma Proving Ground.

Now, changes to the REST are being contemplated that may compromise the integrity of all RECs from customer sited generation in Arizona, including DoD/FEA’s. Several policy proposals have been presented by various parties in this docket for how RECs should be obtained and used for utilities’ compliance requirements in Arizona,

¹ See Arizona Administrative Code §§ R14-2-1801(N) and R14-2-1804.

absent utilities paying up front incentives in exchange for long term REC purchase agreements. Given DoD/FEA's significant investments in renewable energy in Arizona, and their use of RECs for their own Federal compliance requirements, DoD/FEA assert that any policy adopted by the Commission should maintain the viability of RECs and should not result in double counting. In the alternative, a waiver from any policy that takes RECs without just compensation and an explicit transfer agreement should be granted for customers with their own compliance requirements like DoD/FEA. Any policy that results in double counting, or that automatically transfers RECs to utilities without just compensation, would deprive DoD/FEA of a benefit of its investments in renewable energy, and may result in future renewable projects planned in Arizona being canceled or diverted to another state. At an absolute minimum, any change in policy that results in a transfer of RECs without just compensation should only apply to future projects where no agreements have been executed, and not to existing projects or existing contractual relationships.

II. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' RENEWABLE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("EPACT 2005") requires, in part, that 7.5% of all energy consumed by the Federal government each year originate from renewable energy sources.² Executive Order 13423 ("EO13423") requires that half of the 7.5% renewable requirement originate from renewable energy sources placed in service after January 1, 1999, and promotes development of renewable generation projects on Federal Agency

² Renewable Energy Requirement Guidance for EPACT 2005 and Executive Order 13423 marked as DoD/FEA Exhibit 4 at pg. 1.

property for that agency's use.³ Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs") are used to determine compliance with both EPACT 2005 and EO13423.⁴

DoD/FEA has received specific guidance ("Guidance") from the Department of Energy ("DOE") on how RECs must be used to comply with the requirements of EPACT 2005 and EO13423.⁵ The DOE Guidance explicitly contains a prohibition against double counting, stating as follows:

RECs that count toward the EPACT 2005 and EO13423 Requirements cannot be double counted[.] *It is important to protect the credibility of RECs in the general market where they are traded, and double counting could jeopardize that credibility.* (emphasis added)⁶

The DOE Guidance goes on to define double counting as occurring when:

- a) more than one party at the same time claims the renewable energy attributes from renewable energy generation (as either RECs or as renewable energy), i.e., the renewable energy is "double sold" to other customers; or
- b) *the renewable energy counted toward the agency's goal is also used to meet a renewable portfolio standard or other federal, state, or local regulatory requirement, except for the exemptions provided to projects initiated prior to final publication of this guidance; or*
- c) non-energy attributes such as emissions credits/allowances or other environmental attributes are further disaggregated from the renewable attributes by the renewable energy/REC supplier and sold separately. (emphasis added)⁷

Additionally, the DOE Guidance requires DoD/FEA to retain their RECs, stating:

It is expected that Federal renewable energy use under EPACT 2005 and EO13423 will result in renewable energy use beyond the existing state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) goals. Any RECs sold or relinquished to meet State RPS goals or corporate renewable energy goals that are not replaced with other RECs do not contribute to the goals established by EPACT 2005 or EO13423. This is to prevent Federal agencies from claiming credit for renewable energy attributes that are also claimed by

³ *Id.* at pg 1 -3.

⁴ *Id.* at pg. 4.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.* at pg. 6.

⁷ *Id.* at pg. 7.

other parties such as states or corporations (see Section 3.1.4.2). Therefore, agencies are required to retain ownership of the RECs from projects in order to count them toward EPACT 2005 or EO13423 Requirements.⁸

DoD/FEA use RECs in accordance with this Guidance to count toward compliance with the EPACT 2005 and EO13423. In some instances, DoD/FEA installations sell RECs, either to a third party or to a utility, where such an arrangement increases the economic viability of a project. When RECs are transferred for value to make renewable projects more cost effective, a DoD/FEA department may purchase replacement RECs on the open market to count toward its compliance requirements. REC integrity is essential to DoD/FEA's use of RECs; if REC integrity is compromised by allowing a utility to claim RECs without an explicit transfer supported by adequate consideration, those RECs could not be used toward Federal compliance requirements or transferred for value.

III. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS IN ARIZONA

For obvious reasons to anyone who lives or has visited this great state, Arizona is a very attractive place to build solar energy facilities. To take advantage of the abundance of consistent, reliable sunshine, DoD/FEA has invested in solar facilities in Arizona, with plans for future investments. These investments were made, in part, due to the existing REST rules that allow for DoD/FEA to use RECs generated at their Arizona facilities for Federal compliance requirements, or to transfer them for value as needed and DOE guidance allows.

Among the DoD/FEA agencies and departments that have made investments in Arizona solar, the VA has invested over \$50 million on existing solar projects without

⁸ *Id.* at pg. 8. Agencies are allowed to swap or trade RECs in certain instances, as described in Section 3.2.2.

taking incentives from utilities.⁹ The VA has built customer sited solar photovoltaic generation in Phoenix, Prescott, and Tucson, amounting to over 10.6 MW of capacity collectively.¹⁰ VA also has future investments in solar generation planned in Arizona.¹¹

The Department of the Air Force ("AF") is in the process of having a 14.5 MW solar photovoltaic facility constructed on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. For the Davis-Monthan Project, AF has transferred the RECs to a third party to reduce the costs of energy purchased from the third party, and the third party has transferred those RECs for value to Tucson Electric Power. These transfers are made pursuant to fully executed enforceable contracts.

The Department of the Army ("Army") is in the process of planning several installations in Arizona. Projects are being evaluated at Fort Huachuca and Yuma Proving Ground.¹² RECs play a critical role in Army's planning of future projects in Arizona.¹³ Army is exploring different options for using RECs to make projects more cost effective or for Federal compliance requirements.¹⁴

IV. ANY POLICY ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION SHOULD PROTECT AGAINST DOUBLE COUNTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS

This consolidated docket was initiated to respond to the inquiry by the Commission of how utilities should acquire RECs in the future, absent providing up-front incentives, and what REST rules would need to change in order to effectuate this process. It is significant to note that the REST requirement that 15% of a utility's annual retail kWh

⁹ Direct Testimony of Cynthia J. Córdova marked as DoD/FEA Exhibit 1 at pg. 2.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² Direct Testimony of Kathy Ahsing, P.E. marked as DoD/FEA Exhibit 2 at pg. 5.

¹³ *Id.* at 6.

¹⁴ *Id.*

sales be derived from renewable sources by 2024 is still in its early stages, with only 4% being required this year and 4.5% in 2014.¹⁵

In response to the Commission's inquiry, the utilities, staff, and several interveners have proposed various different approaches, which have been explained in more detail by the presenting party. Some of these proposals, namely Staff's proposal and Tucson Electric Power Company's ("TEP") proposal, may grant utilities' the ability to claim RECs without entering into an explicit agreement, supported by consideration, for them and to use those RECs toward their compliance requirements. RECs, or the renewable attribute of energy, used by utilities for REST compliance cannot be used by DoD/FEA for any other purpose, or double counting would occur. For this reason, DoD/FEA strongly opposes any policy that would allow utilities to claim RECs without an explicit agreement supported by adequate consideration. In addition to the problem of double counting, a policy that allows utilities to take RECs without a transfer supported by consideration may result in a regulatory taking. For the aforementioned reasons, DoD/FEA opposes Staff's proposal and TEP's proposal.

Any proposal that would result in DoD/FEA's inability to use their RECs due to double counting should not be adopted by the Commission. DoD/FEA have made significant investments in renewable generation in Arizona, and any policy that resulted in double counting would deprive DoD/FEA of this investment and may detrimentally affect existing contractual agreements. Moreover, if a policy that resulted in double counting were adopted, it is likely that any plans for DoD/FEA to develop additional renewable energy projects in Arizona would be abandoned. At a bare minimum, if the Commission chooses to adopt a policy that erodes or destroys REC integrity, such policy should not

¹⁵ See Arizona Administrative Code R14-2-1804.

affect existing projects or planned projects where binding agreements are in place. Investments and agreements that have already been made based on the policies currently in effect should not be affected or undermined by any changes ultimately adopted.

While DoD/FEA does not advocate for any specific policy on RECs in Arizona, it does not oppose proposals that do not implicate double counting. Policies that maintain the integrity of RECs and a party's ability to use its RECs as it sees fit are the only policies that should be considered acceptable by the Commission. Among the acceptable policies are market based proposals where a firm offer or auction process would be established for utilities to procure RECs, Arizona Public Service Company's proposal, and the Residential Utility Consumer Office's ("RUCO") modified baseline proposal.¹⁶

V. CONCLUSION

DoD/FEA has invested heavily in solar photovoltaic generation in Arizona, with substantial projects planned in the future. RECs are used by DoD/FEA for its own Federal renewable energy requirements, or to increase the economic viability of projects. Any change in REC policy that results in double counting of RECs could severely inhibit the growth of renewable generation in Arizona, and may result in the abandonment of future DoD/FEA projects planned in Arizona.

Arizona, with its abundance of sun, is a leader in solar renewable energy, and it should not adopt policies that could diminish its standing. Any policy regarding RECs adopted by the commission should maintain REC integrity and avoid double counting.

¹⁶ RUCO presented a witness from the Center for Resource Solutions ("CRS"), Jennifer Martin. CRS certifies more than ninety percent of U.S. voluntary retail REC sales. Jennifer Martin was called on to testify on whether individual proposals would result in double counting. As a national leader in certification of RECs to ensure that double counting doesn't occur, it would be prudent give weight to this testimony and to seek guidance from CRS on whether any proposal chosen by the Commission results in double counting before such proposal is adopted, to ensure REC integrity is safeguarded.

Several proposals put forward in this docket achieve this goal. While the Commission should not adopt a policy that diminishes or destroys REC integrity in Arizona, if such a policy is adopted, it should not affect existing projects or agreements in place before the new policy is in effect.

Respectfully submitted,



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And
All Other Federal Executive Agencies